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                              Why Can’t Colleges Control Their Costs ?
                                                     by
                                      Ronald G. Ehrenberg*
*Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and Economics at Cornell
University and Director of the Cornell Higher Education Research Institute (CHERI). I
am grateful to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and other donors for their financial
support of CHERI. This paper summarizes some of the material presented in Ehrenberg
(1999a, 1999b and forthcoming). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
“Forum For the Future of Higher Education 1999 Symposium”, Aspen Colorado,
September 27, 1999.
2I. Tuition Keeps Rising at Selective Private Institutions
 Over 30 years ago William Bowen (1967) studied data from a set of selective
private institutions and concluded that their tuition levels had been rising, on average, by
2 to 3 percent more annually than the rate of inflation ever since the turn of the 20th
century. He attributed this partially to the increased specialization of knowledge and the
growth of new fields of study. But first and foremost, this occurred because the nature of
the educational process did not permit academia to share in the productivity gains that
were leading to the growth of earnings in the rest of society.
Put simply, the number of students the average faculty member educates each
year at these institutions had not changed because low student/faculty ratios were thought
to be essential to high quality education. Hence to avoid a decline in the relative earnings
of faculty, which might make it difficult to retain existing faculty and attract new ones,
tuition had to be increased by more than inflation to provide revenue for salary increases.
Inasmuch as real incomes of families were increasing during the period, due to real wage
growth and increased female labor force participation, tuition had not risen relative to
median family income during most of the period.
In recent years, tuition has similarly continued to increase by more than inflation.
However, during the 1980s real income growth in the United States stagnated. As a result,
tuition growing by more than inflation meant that tuition as a share of family income was
increasing. Figure 1 illustrates this point for Cornell University but the story is the same
for the average selective private institution in the nation. Between 1966-67 and 79-80
tuition remained roughly 26 to 28 percent of median family income. By 1992-93 this ratio
had risen to 49 percent. During the mid-1990s, median family income began to grow again
in real terms and the ratio stabilized at this now higher level. However, the damage had
been done. The concern that college costs were taking a greater share of the typical
family’s income was magnified by the rapid run up in endowments that took place during
the booming stock market of the 1990s. Families wondered why the selective institutions
even had to raise tuition at all?
 I am going to claim in this paper that there are a number of forces, in addition to
the ones that Bowen discussed, that continue to put upward pressure on tuition. These
include the aspirations of academic institutions, our “winner take all” society, the shared
system of governance that exists in academic institutions, recent federal government
policies, the role of external actors such as alumni, local government, the environmental
movement and historic preservationists, periodicals that rank academic institutions, and
how universities are organized for budgetary purposes and select and reward their deans.
3After briefly discussing each of these forces, I will present some results from a survey I
recently conducted of large research universities to obtain information on how they
organize themselves for budgetary purposes. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts
on the steps that academic institutions themselves must take if they want to hold down
their costs.
II. Selective Academic Institutions are Similar to Cookie Monsters
The objective of selective academic institutions is to be the very best that they can
in every aspect of their activities. . They are like cookie monsters. They aggressively seek
out all the resources that they can find and put them to use funding things that they think
will make them better. They want better facilities, better faculty, improved research
support, improved instructional technology, and better students.
All of these things take more money. While they could aggressively try to increase
their efficiency, reduce costs, and get better by substitution rather than growing
expenditures, they don’t do this for a number of reasons that I will shortly mention.
Rather they adopt the attitude that as long as large lines of high quality applicants are
flocking to their doors and accepting their offers of admissions there is no reason for them
to moderate their tuition increases.
III. The “Winner Take All” Society
And flock to our doors they do. As Bob Frank and Phil Cook (1995) and Carolyn
Hoxby (1997) have pointed out, the fraction our of our nations top students, as measured
by test scores, that choose to enroll in the selective private institutions has increased
substantially over time. Certainly the development of need blind admissions and need
based financial aid played a role, as did reductions in transportation and communication
costs, in causing this increased concentration of top students.
More recently, the increased income inequality in the United States has caused
students and their families to increasingly want to (in Bob Frank’s terms) “buy the best”.
My own research with Dominick Brewer and Eric Eide suggests that they are wise to do
so, because the economic return to attending a selective private institution rather than
another academic institution is large and there is evidence that it has increased in recent
years.1
Each of the selective institutions wants to remain in the subset of schools that
students find attractive. So each winds up in what many have called an “arms race of
spending” to make itself look better than its competitors. This spending is not restricted
to the academic parts of institutions. Institutions also compete with athletics’ facilities
                                                
1  See Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg (1999) and Eide, Brewer and Ehrenberg(1998)
4(including fitness centers), new residence halls and improved dining facilities. For
example, Duke has a freshman campus, so Cornell had better have one also.
Their quest to be the best is true in graduate education and research as well. It is
easier to remain at or near the top nationwide in a field than it is to strengthen a weak field
and achieve a high level of distinction. As a result, at Cornell we swallow as the costs of
conducting research in the physical sciences and engineering rise rapidly (I will return to
this point below) and continue to heavily devote our resources to these fields in which the
university historically has excelled. Pity the poor economist whose models tell him that
to minimize costs, one should substitute away from things that have become relatively
more expensive.2 Pity the poor university that finds that to maintain its historic
excellence, it has to skimp in other areas and continue to raise tuition at rates that exceed
inflation.
IV Shared Governance
Why selective private institutions fail to seriously consider the option of reducing
their costs, rather than raising tuition, to find the revenue to enhance their operations
derives to a large extent from how they are governed. Their system of shared governance
between trustees, administrators, and faculty almost guarantees that they will be slow to
react to cost pressures.
Trustees are often successful business people, who know how to cut costs and
meet budget constraints. However, if the President of a university, such as Cornell, tells
them that they need to spend money for new initiatives in genomics, advanced materials
and information sciences to maintain the strength of the university and keep it at the
forefront of science and engineering, they are likely to swallow hard and go along with
him. If the President similarly says that they need funds to enhance the living and learning
environment at the university to attract students, they similarly will likely agree.
 There is however, an important distinction between trustees of private and public
universities. Some background data will help to make this clear. In 1978-79, the average
full professor at a public doctorate granting university earned about 91% of what his or
her counterpart at private doctorate granting universities earned. This ratio fell steadily
during the 1980s and early 1990s until it stabilized at about 78 to 80%. This fall in public
universities’ relative salaries made it difficult for the publics to hire and retain top faculty
and invariably led to some decline in these institutions’ academic quality.
Similarly, between 1988 and 1994, state appropriations to public higher education
per full-time student fell in real terms by about 10%. While tuition increases made up for
part of this decline, in real terms spending per student fell at many state institutions.
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5During the same time period real expenditures per student were relentlessly increasing at
the selective privates. Hence the disparity between the quality of the two types of
institutions grew.
Do these data suggest that trustees of public institutions care less about the
quality of their institutions than do trustees of private institutions? In most case the
answer is no although there are some states, such as New York, in which some people
have serious questions about the trustees’ goals. However, unlike private university
trustees, public university trustees often do not have final control over the tuition levels
that their institutions charge or their state appropriations. The political process often
makes these decisions.
In some states, such as in New York, public university trustees do have control
over tuition. However, if the governor lets them know that he wants tuition held constant,
it would be foolhardy for the trustees not to accede to his wishes. To do so would leave
them vulnerable to the risk of losing their positions. They would also face the possibility
that the political process might penalize them by reducing their state appropriation by
the amount of the increase in revenue that they gained by increasing tuition. So budgets in
public institutions have been cut in spite of their trustees concern.
Faced with tight budgets due to pressures to reduce state income taxes and the
need for more funds for health care, welfare, and the criminal justice system,
administrators at the publics make hard decisions and take the steps necessary to balance
their budgets. They can always blame the cuts that they must make on state government.
 In contrast, if administrators at private institutions were to recommend budget
cutbacks, all blame would be assigned to them. They would be widely accused by the
faculty of not making a strong enough case to the trustees of the need for higher tuition to
maintain institutional quality. Rather than risk losing the support of the faculty, the
typical president and provost will often swallow hard and recommend raising tuition by
more than they otherwise would prefer to provide some budget relief. After all,
administrative terms are not that long and once an administrator loses the support of the
faculty, in most cases it is difficult to effectively lead the institution
Why is the support of the faculty so important?  Under the system of shared
governance in place at these institutions, the faculty rules supreme on academic matters.
The faculty also feels that it should play a major role in all other decisions at the
university. To achieve faculty support for projects is often expensive both in terms of
time and dollars. At Cornell for example, the estimated cost of a major new advanced
materials research facility has risen from $40 million to $55 million dollars because of
modifications that needed to be made to win faculty support for the siting of the building.
These modifications, atria to improve the college’s environment and improved
6classrooms, had nothing to do with the underlying academic program for which the
building was being constructed.
V. Federal Government Policies
In recent years the federal government has contributed to the cost pressure on
selective private institutions in at least three ways. First, the Consent decree between the
Ivy League institutions and the Justice Department in the early 1990s now prevents these
institutions from meeting to discuss the financial need of individual common accepted
applicants before financial aid offers are made. While these institutions can, and have,
agreed to base financial aid only on financial need, each is now free to determine “need” as
it sees fit. This has led to increased use of the practice that has become known as “dialing
for dollars” at many of them and the other selective privates, as accepted applicants
submit financial aid offers from elsewhere to an institution in an attempt to improve their
packages. Put simply it is likely that the Consent degree has led to enhanced financial
competition for students and improved financial aid packages.
     Money for enhance financial aid programs comes from increased annual giving,
increased payout from endowments, increased endowments for financial aid and increased
tuition. The richest institutions may have been able to finance their improved programs
out of an increased payout from their endowments. However, for most selective private
institutions, increased financial aid has required at least some additional recycled tuition
revenue. Absent the ability to easily cut expenses elsewhere in the budget, the implication
is that tuition has had to increase by more than would otherwise be the case.
    Second, the value of the maximum Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG) has
not kept up with inflation. Viewed in constant 1997 dollars, the maximum actual BEOG
grant rose from $1500 at the program’s inception to over $4000 in 1975. Since that date it
has declined considerably. After falling to under $2500 in the mid 1990s, it rebounded to
$2700 in 1997. This failure of BEOG levels to keep up with inflation, let alone tuition,
required the private institutions to dig deeper into their pockets for financial aid funds and
increasingly financial aid has become an institutional responsibility, putting more pressure
on tuition.
       Finally, the cost of doing research has skyrocketed at the selective private
universities in recent years as the federal government has put pressure on private research
universities to reduce their indirect cost rates. Between FY1990 and FY1997, the mean
indirect cost rate at the 39 largest private research universities fell from 62% to 56%. In
addition, federal agencies began to put more pressure on all institutions to provide more
matching funds in grant applications. At the same time that direct cost funding levels were
often being reduced for large center grants, matching fund expectations were growing.
Indeed Cornell has found numerous times that to win a renewal of a major center grant at
the same, or a smaller, level of funding, usually requires the institution to ante up more in
7matching funds.  Funds to make up for the loss of indirect costs revenues and the
increased matching cost commitments came from the general operating budgets of the
institutions and this too put more pressure on their tuition levels.
VI. External Actors: Alumni, Local Government, the Environmental Movement,
and Historic Preservationists
Alumni are vital to selective institutions in a number of ways. They contribute
funds, help to recruit students, provide internship and postgraduate employment
opportunities for students and support the institution politically. They also have strong
preferences about what should be valued and, by strongly communicating these
preferences and threatening to withhold contributions, they discourage institutions from
cutting almost anything. Similarly, they occasionally provide gifts that we academic
institutions don’t really want because they would add to, rather than reduce, the
institutions’ costs. It is a rare president who refuses such gifts.
 Academic institutions also face cost pressures from local governments and interest
groups, such as environmentalists and historic preservationists. The institutions are
always adding new facilities and renovating old ones. To obtain required construction
permits from local governments requires complex discussions and negotiations.
Ultimately, these may lead to the institutions having to make increased financial
payments to local governments to compensate them for our tax-exempt status. A recent
story in the Chronicle of Higher Education discussed how much Harvard is increasing its
payments to the city of Boston to enable it to develop properties that it owns in the city.
 Pressure from environmentalists and historic preservationists may slow down
academic institutions’ projects and increase their costs by much more than similar
pressure would increase the costs of for-profit firms undertaking similar projects. Unlike,
business firms, most academic institutions do not have the option of packing up and
moving to a new location. Also, since they are either public bodies or nonprofits that
receive favorable treatment under tax laws, they are expected to make decisions that are in
the public interest. For example, Cornell’s plans to build a new incinerator to dispose of
toxic wastes from veterinary medicine research have been held delayed over 4 years as the
institution tries to assuage environmentalists’ concerns. Similarly, Yale recently
announced that it was abandoning its plans to demolish several antiquated buildings that
comprised its divinity school because it believed that the cost (in time and money) of
fighting the battle in the courts would prove prohibitive.
VII Published Rankings of Academic Institutions
  When published rankings of academic institutions, such as those conducted by
U.S News & World Report, influence potential students’ perceptions of the underlying
quality of the institutions, no matter how much institutions criticize the rankings they
8have reason to fear that the rankings may influence students’ behavior. A recent study
that I conducted with James Monks shows that this fear is justified.3
 Using data from 30 selective private colleges and universities over an 11-year
period, Monks and I found that changes in an institution’s ranking do influence its
admissions outcomes and its financial aid bill. When an institution’s ranking improves,
this leads to an increase in applicants, a reduction in the fraction of applicants that the
institution accepts, an increase in its yield on accepted applicants, an increase in its
freshman class’s test scores, and a decrease in the amount of financial aid that it must
offer to enroll the class.
     As a result, institutions have an incentive to take actions that will positively influence
their ranking.  To the extent that the rankings are partially based upon how much an
institution spends educating each student, no administrator in his or her right mind would
take actions to reduce the institution’s educational expenditures unless he or she was
forced to by the trustees. You can imagine how members of the Cornell Trustees’ finance
committee reacted when I told them once (when they were pressing us to behave more
like a business and reduce costs) that for us to take action to unilaterally reduce our costs
would result in a worsening in Cornell’s position in the USNWR rankings.
     Cornell’s rank rose from 14th    among national universities in the fall 1997 USNWR
ranking to 6th in the fall 1998 ranking. Not surprisingly there was an increase in applicants
for its fall 1999 freshman class, it admitted a smaller fraction of these applicants, its yield
rose and its entering classes’ test scores rose. Sadly for Cornell, its rank fell back to 11th in
the fall of 1999, primarily because USNWR changed the formula that it used to compute
the rankings. It was my sad task to inform our President and Provost that while I was
happy that they were basking in the glory of how well the Cornell freshman class looked
this year, our research suggested that Cornell would be lucky if it did as well next year.
VIII. How Universities Organize Themselves
The final factors that influence universities’ inability to hold down their costs is
how the institutions are organized for budgetary purposes and how they select and
reward their deans. Ehrenberg (1999a, 1999b) discusses these issues in detail. I summarize
some of the key points below and present some new evidence on how universities
actually are organized for budgetary purposes.
       During the spring and summer of 1999 I conducted a survey of the resource allocation
methodologies that are used at research and doctorate universities Over 200 of the
approximately 220 institutions in the sample responded to the survey. While I would like
to believe that they did so because they recognized my name, more likely it was because
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9William Bowen, the President of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, provided me with a
cover letter to encourage their participation.
       Simplifying greatly, there are four broad types of research allocation methodologies
or systems of budgetary arrangements that universities use:
1. Central Control- Under such a system, all revenue, with the possible exception of
some external gifts and the direct costs on external research grants, flows directly to
the central administration. The central administration covers it central costs and then
allocates some portion of the remaining revenues back to the individual colleges.
 
2. Tubs- Each college is treated as a “tub” on its own bottom. It keeps all of its tuition
and other sources of revenue that it generates. It remits funds to the central
administration only to cover its allocated share of the central costs. Each college is
responsible for all the direct and indirect costs that it incurs, including facilities,
maintenance and operating costs.
 
3.  Tubs with a Franchise Fee- Each college is treated as a tub on its own bottom, but
it remits more than its allocated share of central costs to the central administration.
The extra amount that the college remits is based upon its revenues or its
expenditures. This “franchise fee” is then allocated back to the various colleges at the
discretion of the central administration and/or through some priority setting process.
 
4. Activity Driven- Under this type of approach, each college remits to the center a
share of its total expenditures. The share it remits may differ depending upon whether
the expenditures are for teaching, sponsored research, or other programs (for example
executive education). No explicit allocation of central costs to different units is made.
The center uses the money it receives to cover central costs and then reallocates any
excess funds back to the colleges as in the third methodology.
The benefits that a pure responsibility center management type model (model 2
above) provides, including the incentives that are present for the units to manage their
own resources prudently and to generate revenues, are well known. However, in
Ehrenberg (1999a, 1999b), and much more extensively in Ehrenberg (forthcoming), I argue
that an unwanted side effect of the approach is that it reduces the incentive for individual
colleges to collaborate and to take actions that are in the best interests of the institution as
a whole. Put another way, what makes economic sense for a unit does not necessarily
help to reduce duplication and hold costs down for the university as a whole.
       So to the first thing that I wanted to know in my survey is how many institutions
utilize “pure” RCM models. I asked respondents to ignore the medical colleges in their
responses (for reasons that those institutions with medical colleges surely understand).
The survey responses indicate that central control is by far the most prevalent form of
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organization, with 63% of the privates and 92% of the publics being organized this way.
Only 22 of the universities were organized as tubs and this form of organization was most
prevalent in private research I institutions.
       Of course how universities are formally organized is not necessarily a good indication
of how they actually behave. One provost who I visited at a best-unnamed major public
research I university told me that while all tuition revenue came directly to his office, not
the colleges, he had never thought about doing anything other than giving each unit back
the tuition revenue that it generated. A second provost who I spoke to at a public
research II institution told me that while he had the authority to reallocate tuition
revenues across the colleges, it caused him too much aggravation to do so.
       To see if these attitudes were more widespread, the survey also asked those
universities that had answered that the center fully controlled the allocation of revenues
whether in practice their incremental allocations deviated substantially from
proportionality. In almost half of these institutions in both the public and private sectors,
the answer was no. While this may reflect satisfaction by the central administration with
the way things are going at each of these institutions, it also may reflect that each’s
colleges are de facto being treated as tubs.
    Asking institutions which budget model best fits them may drastically oversimplify
things and the survey also included a set of questions about specific types of income to
probe matters further. For example, answers to the question “is the allocation of tuition
revenue from on-campus degree programs under the control of the central administration
of your university” were similar to the answers about central control. However, revenues
from non-degree programs (continuing education or executive education) or degree-
programs off campus (including distance learning programs) were less likely to be under
the control of the central administration.
    Who “owns” the endowment and who bears the cost of raising new funds are also
important dimensions of institutional control. The individual colleges at one private
research university that I visited last year keep all of their tuition revenue. At first glance,
this institution appears to be organized as a set of tubs.  However, the university as a
whole has a large endowment which is “owned” primarily by the central administration.
As a result, the provost is able to heavily influence the behavior of the units through his
control of the allocation of endowment spending.
     The survey responses indicate that it is much more likely in public than in private
institutions that at least part of the costs of development activities are borne explicitly by
the colleges. It is also more likely that this occurs in research I rather than other
institutions.  The percentage of endowment spending that is under the control of the
central administration varied widely across institutions. However, on balance, there
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appears to be more central control over endowment at the private than at the public
institutions.
      A final important factor that determines whether an institution can behave in an
efficient matter and function as a whole is how deans are appointed and evaluated. At
many institutions, committees of primarily faculty from the college conduct a search for a
dean and then provide the president or provost with an unranked list of the leading
candidates. However, the discussion that accompanies that list makes clear who the first
choice candidate really is and typically that candidate is selected.
 Once in office, among the dean’s primary responsibilities, especially in the
universities that operate as tubs, are fund raising and external relations (alumni,
constituents of the college, state policy makers).  If a dean is successful on these
dimensions and retains the support of the faculty, it is difficult for a provost or president
to penalize the dean (including in the extreme case removing him or her from the position)
for failing to cooperate in university wide initiatives. Deans thus have very little incentive
to cooperate in activities that they do not perceive of as being in the best interest of their
colleges.
           The limited power of central administrators to influence dean’s behavior became
clear to me when in recent years the presidents of Columbia and Georgetown tried,
respectively, to remove and not reappoint a dean. In both cases, pressure from alumni and
key trustees (including the threat of withholding funds) caused the presidents to publicly
rescind their decisions.  One wonders if the two presidents had failed to follow perhaps
the most important advice that a president can be given - never make a major decision on
campus that will eventually rise to the level of the trustees without first obtaining key
trustees’ support for the decision.
IX What Selective Private Institutions Can Do to Help Control Costs
             Selective private colleges and universities have been raising their tuition levels, on
average, by 2 to 3 percent more than the rate of inflation for at least a century. To achieve
in the future some moderation in the real rate of tuition increases will require actions from
federal and state government and the institutions themselves. Many of these are discussed
in my book (Ehrenberg, forthcoming). I conclude by briefly mentioning some of the
implications of my discussion for institutional policies.
            First, as my discussion of the differences between public and private institutions
indicated, the trustees of the latter are key actors in efforts to control costs. If efforts to
moderate tuition increases are to come, they must be led by the trustees. Absent, strong
directives from the trustees, it is difficult for presidents and provosts to advocate such
policies.
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Second, the selective universities should organize themselves for budgetary
purposes in a way that gives the central administration some control over resources and
some levers to influence the behavior of college deans. If academic institutions are serious
about improving the efficiency of their operations and controlling costs, pure tub models
are not the way to go. What is in the best interest of an individual unit is not necessarily
in the best interest of the university as a whole. Central control over resources removes
many of the incentives that units have to raise revenues and hold down their own costs.
Hence, variants of the “tubs with franchise fees” or activity driven models are the
preferred alternatives.
Third, college deans at universities must be held responsible for the well being of
the institution as a whole, not just their individual college. This should be an explicit part
of their job responsibilities. Faculty and alumni connected to their colleges should be
educated to understand that this is an important part of dean’s jobs. Serious performance
evaluations of dean’s need to be held annually to reinforce this point.
             Fourth, trustees and key alumni need to be educated so that they too understand
that what is best for “their” college is not necessarily what is best for the institution as a
whole and that they too need to think of the latter. This is a hard sell but something that
central administrators can profitably devote time to doing.
Fifth, institutions need to conduct regular serious evaluations of all aspects of
their academic and nonacademic activities to decide whether efficiencies can be achieved in
any activity or whether it makes sense for the institution to stop doing any activity
completely. Put another way, the institutions need to get themselves in the mindset of
growing by substitution, not by expansion. Faculty legitimately gripe at having to
participate in mindless program reviews that get filed away and that have no impact, so
these evaluations must be substantive. There is a tradeoff between accountability and
collegiality and serious program reviews may reduce the latter. However, that is a price
that the selective institutions may have to pay for trying to be more accountable and
holding down their costs.
Finally, institutions should stress much more heavily the sharing of academic and
administrative resources, both across units within a campus and across institutions. The
announcement earlier this year that Columbia, Yale and the New York Public library are
building a single repository to house rarely used books of all three institutions is but the
tip of the iceberg of things that can be done. More sharing of academic resources by
teaching of specialized courses to students on several campuses simultaneously, through
the use of distance learning technologies is another example. Institutions will have to think
very seriously about how they can expand cooperation with their competitors.
Academic institutions are already cooperating on a number of administrative
fronts. For example, many are involved in the joint development of information systems
13
for human resources, student services, libraries, development and alumni relations,
sponsored programs, and financials. They now need to take the next step and ask if there
are ways to share administrative services across campuses to achieve further economies of
scale and cost savings. Is it really necessary, for example, for each institution to have its
own purchasing department?
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